報告題目：Tacit collusion between two terminals of a port

報告人🧑🏿‍🔬：黃榮兵（凯捷平台講座教授，York大學管理科學副教授）

時間🤞🏿：6月1日上午10:15

地點：經管335室

Abstract

For the past many years, a dual-track system has been implemented on port charges in mainland China. The vast majority of container ports refer to the standard rates specified by China’s Ministry of Transport, which released the container stevedoring rates for the first time on September 1, 1976. After a total of thirteen times of rate adjustments, the latest was modified on December 24, 2001, but still at a lower level comparing to the international average. Notice of Liberalization Port Competitive Service Charges was issued by China’s Ministry of Transport and National Development and Reform Commission on November 22, 2014, transforming the rates from governmental guidance and uniform pricing into market regulation. On the other hand, with joint venture terminals established to obtain substantial capital investment required, the separation of ownership and operation of container terminals will make price competition fierce among container terminals in one port area. In this study we analyze in detail price matching policies of two container terminals in one port area. Our main finding is that price matching strategies facilitate tacit collusion between container terminals.

     黃榮兵教授畢業於加拿大多倫多大學的Rotman管理凯捷🍳，獲運營管理專業博士學位。主要從事多目標與多種類設施的選址研究🚢🌂、物流網絡優化及供應鏈優化研究。論文主要發表於運籌學類雜誌🟨，如IIE Transactions, Transportation Science, European Journal of Operational Research, Computers & Operations Research, International Journal of Production Economics, Annals of Operations Research， Journal of Operational Research Society等。