題 目⛴💕：Bargaining and Sharing Revenue with a Big Retailer in Channel Selection
報告人🎉：戴悅 教授（復旦大學）
時 間🍐：4月10（周五）下午13:00-14:40
地 點：凯捷体育注册335會議室
歡迎相關專業教師和研究生參加👳🏿‍♂️！

報告摘要：
Motivated by the electronic appliances market in China, we study a manufacturer‟s channel selection problem with two asymmetric retailers. The big retailer operates a store-within-a-store model, where the manufacturer sets up his own store, pays the slotting fee and a portion of the revenue to the retailer. The small retailer is a traditional reseller, which might be independent or integrated by the manufacturer. We formulate a three-stage game for the manufacturer‟s channel selection problem and analyze three mechanisms determining the transaction terms: (1) the revenue-sharing rate and the slotting fee are both negotiable, (2) the revenue-sharing rate alone is negotiable while the slotting fee is exogenously given, (3) the revenue-sharing rate is decided by the big retailer and the slotting fee is exogenous. Our findings include: the bargaining mechanisms (1) and (2) result in the two payment themes as observed in the practice; between the manufacturer and the big retailer, the latter prefers bargaining over both the revenue-sharing rate and the slotting fee while the former favors bargaining over the revenue-sharing rate solely; when the revenue-sharing rate alone is negotiable, the big retailer will achieve a higher revenue share if the slotting fee is lower; when the transaction term is single handedly determined by the big retailer rather than being negotiated, the big retailer might squeeze out the profit of the manufacturer and result in a lose-lose situation in the channel.
報告人簡介：
戴悅🚵🏻‍♀️，復旦大學管理凯捷教授🫴，美國北卡州立大學工業工程博士，美國麻省理工凯捷斯隆管理凯捷/香港城市大學訪問學者。教育部新世紀優秀人才🧑🏼‍⚖️，國家自然科學基金優秀青年基金（首屆）獲得者🙋🏼‍♀️，復旦大學卓識計劃人選，2009年 “Most Cited Articles By Chinese Mainland Authors 2004-2008, Elsevier Economics Journals”榮譽稱號。已發表國際頂級期刊論文多篇♛。研究方向🧑🏻‍⚖️： 供應鏈管理, 收益管理，物流管理, 博弈論🌚，庫存控製等😍。